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THE FUNCTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
REQUIRING UNIFORMITY IN TAXATION*
By

WILLIAi L. MArrHEwS, JR.**

PART III
UNIFORMITY AND SPECIFIC TAX LEGISLATION
CHAPTER IV
UNIFORMITY AND TAX LEGISLATION IN GENERAL
The general and necessarily glittering language one can find in the
historical material and the cases to describe the uniformity provisions
is interesting and helpful; but it is far more practical to examine their
use in determining the constitutionality of specific tax legislation, because. an understanding of their function is largely ephemeral when
divorced from the findings of a given court on a given tax at a given
time. Generalities furnish an essential background and cannot be
ignored, but they must be complemented with a consideration of
uniformity in relation to its effect on the principal taxes enacted by
many jurisdictions during recent years.
The courts exhibit a continuing interest in the problems of constitutional phraseology, scope, and effect when directing their attention to specific statutes. Phraseology seems to give them little trouble
since few cases are found where the validity of a tax is resolved on
that basis alone. Questions of scope are more difficult, however, for
in answering them they must decide if the tax is one on property, and
the decision on this point can be the primary ground for finding a
statute unconstitutional. It is in the solution of these questions that
the labeling process has had such a dominant role and the taxing
power of the legislature has been most effectively limited by the Judiciary In many cases the nature of the tax is decided before any other
issue is considered so that no further decision is necessary If the kind
of uniformity required by the constitution is considered inapplicable
to the kind of tax involved, the court proceeds to determine the
* This is the second of four articles based on a thesis written in partial fulfillmei of requirements for the S.J.D. degree at the University of Michigan Law
School. The first article appeared in the November, 1949. issue of the JOURNAr. and
the others will appear in the next two issues.
** A.B., LL.B., LL.M. Professor of Law, University of Kentucky, Lexington.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

validity of the classifications attempted and the solution of such other
points as the provisions of the statute may present. To this extent,
the solution of problems in phraseology, scope and effect of the constitutional provisions represent the stages of decision, or sequence of
events, as well as the bases for distinctions in kinds of uniformity
Most tax legislation survives the initial stage so its character or nature and manner or method must sustain its claim to the respectability
afforded by judicial approval. The right of various taxes, measured
by these two qualifications, to wear the cloak of constitutional sanction
-a garment zealously guarded by the courts-is our immediate concern.
Attempts to distinguish between property taxes and other taxes
except by resorting to incidents are illusory if not useless because
sooner or later one will find a decision which denies every nice and
precise criterion he may choose to advance. Nevertheless, since the
uniformity provisions purport on their face, or are construed, to be
principally a limitation on property taxation, 1 9 a finding on this question is essential to the constitutionality of any tax. Similarly, the differences between permissible classifications and unreasonable ones
are not conducive to general definition, but as long as the uniformity
provisions do not require an absolute rule for all taxes, differences
must be found. The most that can be done short of examining all the
cases, a manifest impossibility, is to consider those which best illustrate the effect of uniformity on (1) taxes clearly in the nature of
property taxes, (2) taxes which may be labeled property or nonproperty, (8) taxes clearly non-property in nature, and (4) income
taxes. The last named seem to have acquired a nature and dignity all
their own. In each category assumed the power of the legislature to
classify is an integral part of a court's complete decision, and is, therefore, considered in the discussion of each.

"I For a listing of constitutional provisions by states see Table I, which appeared
as an appendix to the first article, 38 Ky. L. J. 69. Lee v. State Tax Commission, 219
Ala. 513, 123 So. 6 (1939); Morris v. State, 40 Ariz. 32, 9 P 2d 404 (1932); Wiseman v.
Phillips, 191 Ark. 63, 84 S.W. 2d 91 (1985); People v. McCrear, 34 Cal. 432 (1868);
Hughes v. State, 97 Colo. 279, 49 P 2d 1009 (1935); Jacksonville Gas Company v.
Lee, 110 Fla. 61, 148 So. 188 (1933); Adams Motor Company v. Cler, 149 Ga. 818, 102
S. E. 440 (1919); Diefendorf v. Gallet, 51 Idaho 619, 10 P 2d (1932); Lutz v. Arnold,
208 Ind. 480, 193 N. E. 840 (1935); State v. Cline, 91 Kan. 416, 137 Pac. 932 (1916):
Strater Brothers Tobacco Companyv. Commonwealth, 117 Ky. 6104, 78 S.V 871
(1904); Gulf Refining Company v. McFarland, 154 La. 251, 97 So. 433 (1923); Oursler
v. Tawes, 178 Md. 471, 13 A. 2d 763 (1940).

CHAPTER V
TAXES CLEARLY IN THE NATURE OF PROPERTY TAXES
SECTION 1.
In General
Due to the many forms the general property tax has taken during
the years of its long existence, one might expect the judicial definition
of property taxation to be broad and inclusive, but actually, the opposite is true. Of numerous taxes before the courts on the ground
that they were property taxes and subject to the constitutional limitations applicable to property taxation, many have been so labeled by
particular jurisdictions, but few can be characterized as clearly in
the nature of property taxes in the sense that all courts will so construe
them. There is marked conflict as to the nature of ad valorem taxes
on representative intangibles, capital stock taxes, taxes involving the
privileged use and ownership of property, income taxes, and many
others where the value of property is taken as some measure of the
exation made. The name attached to a tax by the legislature is of
little consequence in resolving the conflict because the courts on their
own initiative inquire as to the nature of the tax, and seem to be little
impressed with descnptions based on economic reasoning or logic.
Tins tendency to disagree results in part from an effort, conscious or
otherwise, to sustain tax legislation when possible by confining the
restrictive effect of the uniformity provisions to a few taxes. There is
little benefit to be derived from joining the battle of words here except to point out the chief area of agreement: that a tax levied directly
against property according to value based on some form of assessment
is a property tax. If the legislation involves something more than a
property tax in its simplest form there is always the possibility that it
will be labeled non-property Such marginal taxes, capable of being
categorized either way, are best understood when removed from the
problems of uniformity peculiar to property taxation, and are considered here only when necessary to discuss some particular point.
SECTION 2.
The GeneralProperty Tax
The general property tax is founded on the simple rule that all
property should be taxed at the same rate according to value, but in
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application of the rule difficulties arise because of the heterogeneous
nature of property interests. Thus the effect of the uniformity provisions is best portrayed in cases presenting questions of classification
and assessment of property That is to say- problems in uniformity
may occur in the way the tax is levied or the way it is assessed, since
a statute taxing property may be attacked for want of uniformity on
the contention that its rate or valuation is unequal on the same or
different kind of property, or that the assessment made does not apply
alike to all property On the former theory the power of the legislature to classify is the crucial point, while on the latter the validity of
a particular assessment is the major issue. It seems to make little difference whether the constitution calls for a uniform rule, a uniform
rate or a levy according to value, because all have been applied in a
strict or liberal manner at one time or the other. The same is true
whether the meaning of value is taken to be full value, partial value,
actual value, market value, cash value, or average value. The traditional position of the courts coincides with the underlying philosophy
of the general property tax, and a number of states still require property to be taxed at the same rate according to value.110 Many, however, permit the classification of property on one ground or another."'
Modification of the classical rule has taken place through amendments
which limit the effect to uniformity within the class, and by decisions
allowing varying degrees of freedom in the power to classify The
latter method includes the technique of exempting certain property
altogether where the language of the constitution is indefinite, thereby
permitting classification as to taxability if not as to rate.ii " Also
utilized is any reference in the constitutional expression of the rule to
species or kinds of property which will support a finding that the legislature's power is commensurate with its ability to draw fine distinctions in this respect. Both methods have been sufficiently pronounced
to make the current problem in uniformity of property taxation primarily one of choosing between a strict and liberal rule.
One of the best comparisons in the effect of the two rules was
made in the opinion of a Montana case, Hilger v Moore,'1 3 decided in
1919. It so happened that the constitution of Montana contained two
relevant uniformity provisions, each of which exists alone in a number
110
Berryman v. Bowers, 31 Ariz. 56, 250 Pac. 361 (1926); Mahoney v. San Diego,
198 Cal. 388, 245 Pac. 189 (1926); Sherlock v. Winnetka, 68 111. 530, 59 N. E. 791
(1900).
"I Pullman Car Corporation v. Hamilton, 229 Ala. 184, 165 So. 616 (1934): Attorney General v. Avon Park, 108 Fla. 641, 149 So. 409 (1933): Williams v. Baldridge,
48 Idaho 618, 284 Pac. 203 (1930); Union Tank Car Company v. Day, 156 La, 1071.
101 So. 581 (1924); Opinion of the Justices, 133 Me. 50, 173 At. 816 (1935).
"I Pullman Car Corporation v. Hamilton, 229 Ala, 184, 155 So. 616 (1934).
"'56 Mont, 147, 182 Pic. 477 (1919).
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of state constitutions. The first provided that the legislature should
levy "a uniform rate of assessment and taxation, and prescribe such
regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all property"14 The second provided that taxes shall .be "uniform on the
same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax."i 5 The legislation in question made a clear-cut effort to
classify property so that all taxable property in the state would be
placed in seven separate categories and each category assessed at a
different percentage of full value. The plaintiff, a personal property
owner, computed his tax according to the percentage applicable to the
appropriate class, tendered the amount due, and, when the county
treasurer assessed the property at its full value, began an action to
restrain him from seizing it for sale. He contended the legislature
had a clear power to establish the class under which he benefited, and
relied on the second constitutional provision set out above. The defendant argued such power was denied by the first provision, and that
the second provision referred to classes of persons only Here was a
rare chance to apply one of two constitutional provisions on the basis
of their effect on the legislative power to classify property The court
made the most of its opportunity by pointing out initially the significance of applying a strict rule: 116
"Fifty years ago, and prior thereto, the rule was generally
understood to require nothing more or less than this: If A and B each
owned taxable property of the same value within the same taxing
district, each should pay thereon precisely the same amount of
tax, without reference to the character of the property. The rule as
thus understood is designated the 'uniformity rule of general property
taxation'
It cannot be open to argument that a provision of

this character does not admit of classification of property for the
purpose of taxation. The meaning is too plain to admit of doubt."
Then, equal attention was given to the theoretical advantages to
7
be gained from classification in the following words:11
"In theory, the doctrine of classification seeks to remove
the temptation to dishonesty in returmng property for assessment; to
shift the burden of taxes from property, as such, to productivity, or
in other words, to impose the burdens of government upon property
inproportion to its use, its productivity, its utility, its general setting
in the economic organization of society, so that everyone will be
called upon to contribute according to his ability to bear the burdens,
or as nearly so as may be, and to relieve administrative officers from
the apparent necessity of continuing the legal fiction of full valuation
in the face of contrary facts."
"' For simiflar proisions see Table I, which appeared as an appendix to the first
article.-38 Ky. L. J. 69.
" Ibid.

" Hilger v. Moore, 56 Mont.
7
" Id. pt 151. 182 Pic. at 483.

117, 182 Pac. .177 -179 (1919).
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In making its choice the court felt constrained to rely on a precise
and technical construction of the constitution in light of other provisions pertaining to taxation generally, plus the usual technique of
turning to the intention of the framers; but it sustained the tax on the
ground that the strict rule had never applied in Montana. The provision calling for a uniform rate of assessment and taxation was construed to require a uniform mode of assessment only to the end that
a just valuation of all taxable property would be secured. Such a construction was considered essential to the interpretation given the second provision that the word "subjects" included property, and that
property could be classified for the purpose of taxation. In the opinion
of the court, the instant legislation had nothing to do with either the
assessment of property or the determination of the rate of the tax levy,
so it violated no part of a uniformity rule derived from a combined
construction of the two provisions to the effect that: "the legislature
shall prescribe such uniform mode of assessment as shall secure a just
valuation of all taxable property,
and all taxes shall be uniform
upon the same class of property within the territorial limits of the
authority levying the tax."11 The court was influenced by other sections of the constitution permitting the state board of equalization to
adjust valuations between different classes of taxable property, establishing an artificial and arbitrary rule for the taxation of certain mining
property, and recognizing the right of the legislature to impose a tax
on livestock in addition to that borne by other property It was not
impressed with defendant's further contention that the classification
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the real importance
of the Hilger case lies in its clear portrayal of the effect of two kinds
of uniformity, it should be noted in passing that the court made an
enlightened choice however strained its logic may have been in reconciling the language of two incompatible provisions in the same
constitution.
It is extremely difficult to generalize about the two positions illustrated in the Hilger case. It has been said in interpreting the more
liberal rule that property may be classified with reference to its kind
or use provided there is a reasonable ground of demarcation, but that
taxability cannot depend on a classification of owners;"i" while juris-

dictions which adhere to stricter standards may find that the taxpayer
can be classified but not property 12 0 There seems to be more reluctance to deviate from a narrow interpretation in the case of real property, probably on the theory that there is less occasion for finding
11

s Id. at 149, 182 Pac. at 481-482.
"'Opinion of the Justices, 84 N. H. 559, 569, 149 Ad. 321, 326 (1930).
' Ames v. People, 26 Colo. 83, 56 Pac. 656 (1899).
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valid distinctions as to kind or species. Thus it is found that a statute
taxing unimproved land in a city at a lower rate than property in a
built-up section is void under the uniformity clause, 121 and a tax of
three cents per acre on land where mineral deposits are owned by
another than the surface owner as invalid because of unreasonable
classification. 12 2 In the latter case the North Dakota court held that
a provision requiring uniformity within the class did not preclude the
legislature from levying a tax differently on different classes of property, but that a distinction based on ownership was unreasonable.
It distinguished an earlier case sustaining a graduated tax on automobiles on the ground that classification as to horsepower was a difference based on the character of the property and reflected a concern
for value. It was said of the immediate legislation that land containing valuable and worthless mineral deposits were treated alike, and
the owner of very valuable mineral reserves could limit his tax liability
a corporation and selling it the
to three cents an acre by 2organizing
3
surface or mineral rights.'
Pennsylvania, where the constitution first permitted uniformity
within a class, has manifested a similar interest in the element of value.
There a floor tax was levied on all whiskey stored at a particular time
according to a specified rate per gallon without concern for a difference in market value because of age. In holding the tax unconstitutional, as one on property levied without consideration of value, the
court said: "Whether the thing taxed is a quantity of liquor or a quantitv of land makes no difference; each is property and a tax to be
must operate alike on the classes of things or property subject
uniform
to it."' 2 4 No attention was given to the fact that the inequality was
one of result rather than method. On the other hand, Minnesota has
interpreted a similar provision so as to allow varying rates of assess25
ment on iron ore property, platted realty, and unplatted realty; and
New Hampshire permits trees to be classified and taxed at a different
rate. ' There the legislature was advised that a statute exempting
all standing trees of less than a fixed diameter and classifying the remainder with respect to such diameter would not be in violation of
uniformity within the class.

'" Monaghan v. Lewis, 21 Del. 218, 59 At. 948 (1905).

122Northwestern Improvement Company v. State, 57 N. D. 1, 220 N. AV 436

(1928).

Id. at 8, 220 N. W. at 439.
Commonwealth v. Overholt, 331 Pa. 182, 191, 200 At. 849, 853 (1936).
I5Apartment Operator's Association and Another v. City of Minneapolisland
Oihers, 191 Minn. 365, 254 N.W 443 (1934).
Opinion of the Justices, 84 N. H. 557, 149 At. 321 (1930).

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

SECTION 3.
The Importance of Value
The single thread of consistency in these cases seems to be the
court's preoccupation with the decisive importance of value. The
North Dakota mineral rights case and the Pennsylvania floor tax decision turned on this point, while the classification allowed in Minnesota and New Hampshire was based on distinctions traceable to
physical conditions enhancing the value of the property such as the
platting of land and the size of trees. This fact is not surprising when
it is remembered that taxation according to value long has been the
most universal test for measuring equality in property taxation. The
test was given constitutional expression in many states,"-- and some
even use the adjectives property and ad valorem interchangeably in
describing a tax. Under the classical rule all property had to be taxed
according to value, and the criterion apparently has been carried over
even where uniformity is limited to a class.
It is not so clear whether property can be classified on the basis
of value. Many attempts to graduate probate fees according to the
value of the estate have been invalidated on the theory that the tax
was one on property, 12 8 and the same fate has been met by income
taxes, taxes on gross receipts, and others as will be seen later. Under
a theory that uniformity is no more restrictive on the power to classify
than equal protection, however, there seems to be no logical reason
why such a basis should not be reasonable. At least there is little
justification for keeping uniformity irrevocably tied to value beyond
the archaic fiscal doctrine underlying the general property tax that
an ad valorem system of property taxation is essential to an equal distribution of the expenses of government. The question is a basic one
in the entire uniformity problem, appearing in all its phases, and not
capable of final solution here. Questions of uniformity in rate, for
instance, rest in part on a comparison of rate in terms of property
value.
In Pingree v Auditor General,"" the Michigan court was asked to
sustain a statute which provided for taxing the telegraph and telephone lines of a telephone corporation at the average rate of all taxes
I-For a listing of constitutional provisions by states see Table I, which appeared as an appendix to the first article.-38 Kv. L. J. 69.
'2 Berryman v. Bowers, 31 Ariz. 56, 250 Pac. 361 (1926); Chapman v. Ada County.
48 Idaho 632, 284 Pac. 259 (1930); Cook County v. Fairbank, 222 111. 578, 78 N.E. 895
(1906): Hauser v. Miller, 37 Mont. 22, 94 Pac. 197 (1908); Malin v. Lamoure Coult\.
582 (1914); Smith v. Carson City, 90 Utah 560, 63 P 2d 259
27 N. D. 140, 145 N.W%.
(1936).
'-9 120 Mich. 95, 78 N.W 1025 (1899).
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raised for all purposes. It was agreed by all concerned that the tax
was one on property, and not a "specific" tax under Michigan's pecuthat
liarly worded constitutional provision, therefore the court found
13
it violated the strict rule of uniformity It was said in part: 0
"It is assessed according to cash value which is a compliance with section 12, but
the fact remains that the rate is
determined in a different way, and is different in amount from taxes
imposed on other property which contributes to st-ite t.Lxes. Taxes

generally assessed for the State bear a proportion to the amount to
is charged with a given and
be raised, and all taxable property
equal percentun upon its assessed value. That cannot be said of this

property."
In other words, uniformity means not only in relation to value,
but also that the rate must be absolutely equal between all property
In contrast Louisiana has sustained a statute containing a strikingly similar statutory provision. 1 1 There it was contended,
inter alia, that a statute taxing the tank cars of a nonresident corporation at the average rate of local taxes on the tank cars of resident corporations was a violation of the state constitutional provision that "all
taxes should be uniform upon the same class of subjects." The court
said, briefly- 32
"It would be difficult to conceive a more uniform state
tax in lieu of local taxes than that which is based upon the general
average of local taxes, widely varying in rates, and wuch is imposed
upon all tank cars owned by non-resident and undomciled owners.
The record establishes the fact that plaintiff is taxed in substantial uniformity with other property holders throughout the state,

and this is all that the law requires."
To this extent at least, Louisiana's liberal application of uniformity would require only a substantial equality between property of
apparently the same kind and value, while in Michigan the concern
for taxation according to value is reflected in a strict uniformity of
rate. Of course the constitutional provisions were different and the
court in the former case talked in terms of a tax levied directly against
the property, while in the latter it was conceived as reaching the
property through the owner; but comparative equality according to
value was the actual basis for requiring absolute uniformity in one, and
substantial uniformity in the other.
Practical defects in the ad valorem system show up best in the
administration of the general property tax because of inequality In
assessments, particularly in those jurisdictions where little or no deviation is made from a strict and ad valorem rule of uniformity Here
r'Id. at 102. 78 N.W. at 1027.
Union Tank Car Compan) v. Day, 156 La. 1071, 101 So. 581 (1924).
*I12d. at 1079. 101 So. at 584.
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uniformity functions as a basis for testing the validity of a particular
assessment made in administering the tax. Under a strict interpretation of the rule the taxpayer usually contends that the uniformity requirement is violated because his property was not debased to the
same level as other property in the taxing district in determining its
assessed value, or that his property was overvalued. Also, he may
contend that there is a discrimination between classes brought about
by the assessment of some other class at a lower level, or its omission
from the tax roll entirely
As far as the first contention is concerned if it is the general practice in a taxing district to assess property at less than its full value,
the uniformity provision will be invoked to assure the similar debasement of all property 133 This is particularly true where the provision
expressly calls for taxation according to value. In view of the regularity with which the courts have granted relief where this type of discrimination is shown, it is hard to account for the result in the case of

Illinois & St. Louis Railroad & Coal Company v Stookey. 34 There
the state equalization board assessed a railroad's property at approximately its fair cash value, and the tax was levied by the local authorities on that basis. When the railroad sought an injunction on the
contention that all other property in the taxing district was assessed
at only one third of its actual value, it was refused on the ground
that the mere fact the local assessor had failed to comply with the
law requiring assessment at fair cash value did not invalidate the
assessment made by the equalization board. That such a holding is
inconsistent with the position normally taken by jurisdictions applying classical uniformity in matters of assessment is clearly shown by a
subsequent Illinois decision made on similar facts. In People ex rel.

McDonough v Grand Trunk Railroad Company,1 35 it was held that
the assessment by the State Tax Commission of a railroad's property
at sixty per cent of actual value, whereas other property in the county
was assessed at only thirty-seven per cent, was a valid defense to a
suit for delinquent taxes.
On the other hand, if the jurisdiction has modified its rule of
uniformity, such an assessment of railroad property at a different percentage of value may be allowed. Thus it was held as early as 1899
in Colorado that a provision requiring uniformity within the class
conferred the power to classify property and prescribe various methods
for ascertaining value, which included the right to provide a different
'" Aldrich v. Harding, $40 I1. 354, 172 N.E. 772 (1930).
"
122 Ill. 356, 13 N.E. 516 (1887).
357 Ill. 493, 192 N.E. 645 (1934).
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method for valuating railroad property; 136 and Wisconsin has found
more recently that its uniformity rule does not prevent the assessing
and taxing of public utilities differently from other property 137
Under a strict rule of uniformity overvaluation of one taxpayer's
property, while property generally in the same district is correctly
valued, seemingly violates the constitutional mandate just as much as
does the failure to debase his property to the same level as that of
other taxpayers. The result in both cases is to require the taxpayer
to pay a greater proportion of taxes according to the value of his property than taxpayers generally In such a situation, however, the courts
are more hesitant about granting relief. Before a taxpayer can be heard
to defend upon the ground that his property has been overvalued,
or before he can secure an injunction restraining collection on that
ground, he must show that he has exhausted Ins administrative
remedies, or that, if the board of review has refused to grant him a
hearing, he has sought by mandamus to compel them to do so.13s
Even in the taxpayer has availed himself of all the remedies provided
by the statutes, the court may say that it will not grant relief unless
he can prove that the overvaluation was made by the assessor for some
corrupt or illegal motive, or that the assessment is so grossly excessive
as to amount to constructive fraud.139 The theory underlying such a
position is that the court is not an assessment body, or at least that it
cannot determine the assessment for property owners not before
the court.
The same difficulty as to remedy occurs where the contention is
made that a discrimination between classes results from the alleged
omission or underassessment of other property The simplest situation of this nature is where the assessor has omitted the property of
one or a few taxpayers, and it seems well settled that such omission,
whether inadvertent or intentional, will not affect the validity of the
tax upon other taxpayers who have been properly assessed. 140 The
complaining taxpayer is left to seek compensation in damages where
the omissions are made willfully and corruptly, or resulting from gross
negligence, and where injury has been suffered. As an alternative,
he can mandamus the assessing officer to compel them to place the
omitted or underassessed property on the assessment rolls at the
proper value. This hardly amounts to classification, but if the omis".Ames v. People, 26 Colo. 83, 56 Pac. 656 (1899).
Light Company v. Tax Commission, 207 Wis. 523, 242 N.W 312 (1932).
For a general discussion see Stason, Judicial Review of Tax Errors-Effect of
Failure to Resort to Administrative Remedies, 28 MicH. L. REv. 637 (1930).
1' See Comment, The lllinois Constitutional Requirement of UniformitV in
Taxation, 33 ILL. L. REV. 57, 67 (1938).
Id. at 69.
I,"
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sions involve large amounts of certain kinds of property, such as personalty, and occur rather continuously, a kind of administrative
classification does result. The obvious breakdown of the narrow concept of uniformity at this point led to the first major break with the
classical rule and resulted in many of the first attempts to classify

property
SECTION 4.

Classifying Property
A statute classifying property on the basis of the clearest distinction possible, real and personal, may be unconstitutional for want of
uniformity in one jurisdiction and valid in another.14i The former
decisions take the questionable view that all property is homogeneous
for the purpose of taxation, and that exemption or classification of one
kind of property creates an undue burden on the type of property
taxed. The fact that insurmountable difficulties in reaching and
assessing personal property may cause gross inequality is ignored in
the strict application of a narrow constitutional mandate. A more
tenable position is taken by those jurisdictions which have profited
by experience and amended the constitution, as is well shown in the
Ohio case of State v Dav,8,142 where it was contended that failure of
the state tax commission to include the property, other than real estate, of interurban railroad companies on the general tax list was a
violation of uniformity The argument was made in spite of a recent
constitutional amendment clearly limiting the uniformity rule to "land
and improvements thereon." 14 3 The court took some pains in denying
the contention to show how the Constitution of 1851 prevented classification with a provision requiring "all property within the limits of a
taxmg district to be taxed by a uniform rule," but that the amended
provision clearly permitted classification into real and personal property; and further, that the latter could be subclassified subject only
to the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution. 14
The position taken in the Davis case was possible because of the
constitutional amendment, but can be reached in the absence of specific revision as indicated by the finding in a comparatively recent
Alabama decision. There the court, in Pullman Car and Manufactur141Mahoney v. San Diego, 198 Cal. 338, 245 Pac. 189 (1936); Opinion of the
Justices, 208 Mass. 616, 94 N.E. 1043 (1911): State v. Drutteschmitt. 4 Nev. 178 (1868).
142 132 Ohio St. 555, 9 N.E. 2d 684 (1937).
13d.
at 559, 9 N.E. 2d at 686.
44
d. at 560. 9 N.E. 2d at 688.
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mg Corporationof Alabama v Hamilton, quoted with approval from
the opinion in an earlier case as follows:14i
"The rule that all taxes, levied on property in this state,

shall be assessed in exact proportion to the value of such property
was extended to personal property and incorporated in the Constitution in 1868. The purpose and scope of this constitutional limitation
was designed to secure uniformity and
on the taxing power
equality by the enforcement of an ad valorem system of. taxation
and to prohibit arbitrary or capricious mode of taxation
Nithout regard to value. This does not mean that all property must
be taxed. Nor does it prohibit exemptions from taxation or such
classlfications of property as are not purely arbitrary, capricious or
without the semblance of reason."

Any differene betveen the Ohio uniformity provision of 1851, and
Alabama's of 1868, is hardly discernible to the objective eye, but in
both the Davs and Pullman cases the power of the legislature to levy
against real property and personal property by distinct standards not
only is recognized but is considered desirable, in sharp contrast to the
frequent demand for strict uniformity
The classification of intangibles presents the courts with a similar
problem in the uniformity of property taxation. The need for such a
distinction in applying the general property tax stems from the same
background surrounding the admimstration of a tax on all personal
property The whole history of property taxation is full of ingenious
efforts to bring property elusive to assessment within the effective
control of the assessing authority Assessing of intangibles at a lower
rate and exempting them from other taxation with the expectation that
tax evasion will be decreased by voluntary declarations, and the
amount of revenue increased thereby, is the remedy most often attempted. Where a strict rule of uniformity is applied this remedy is
defeated at its inception.
An Opinon of the Justices 4 in Massachusetts, for instance, leaves
little doubt as to the effect of the constitutional provision if so construed. The proposed tax exempted from all other taxation, state and
local, classes of intangible personal property including money on hand,
on deposit, or at interest, other debts due the taxpayer, public stocks
and securities, bonds of domestic and foreign corporations, and shares
of capital stock of foreign corporations; and imposed thereon a property tax at the rate of three mills on each dollar of the fair cash value.
The relevant constitutional provision differed somewhat from the
usual wording by stating that the general court was empowered "to
impose and levy proportional and reasonable assessments, rates, and
"'229 Ala. 184, 155 So. 616 (1934).
'
195 Mass. 607 84 N.E. 499 (1908).
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taxes upon all the inhabitants of, and persons resident, and estates
lying within the said Commonwealth." 147 The Justices ruled that

property could not be classified, saying

148

"The general purpose of the constitutional provisions above
quoted is to put the burdens of government equally upon all the
people, in proportion to their ability to bear them.
The provision
requires that all taxes levied under its authority be proportional and
reasonable, and forbids their imposition upon one class of persons or
property at a different rate from that which is applied to other classes,
whether that discrimination is affected directly in the assessment
or indirectly in the valuation through arbitrary and unequal
methods
"The natural effect here
would be to diminish the
amount of property taxable at the regular rate, and to impose upon
the exempted property a tax hardly more than one fifth of the average rate in the cities and towns of the Commonwealth.
The
only plausible argument to the contrary is that, because.of the difficulty of enforcing the law in the taxation of intangible property,
much of it goes untaxed, and the proposed exemption of it in part
would be likely to produce greater returns from it than are obtained
under the present system. We do not think that this conjecture,
justifies a method of taxation which is necessarily, and by intendment, very disproportional."

That the fate of an intangibles tax is not so ignominious m every
state is revealed by its history in Washington, as described in State
ex rel. Atwood v Wooster149 Prior to the adoption of a constitutional
amendment in 1930, the Washington courts had interpreted a pro-

vision reading, "The legislature must provide for a uniform and equal
rate of assessment and taxation on all property according to its value",
to mean that mortgages, bonds, warrants, and other like intangibles
might be classified by the legislature as credits and so escape direct
taxation, but that money could not be.150 Subsequently, the constitu-

tion was changed to read: "All taxes should be uniform upon the same
class of property within the territorial limits of the authority levying

the tax and shall be levied and collected for public purposes only"
In upholding a tax which exempted money and other enumerated intangibles, the court said in the instant case: 1 5'
"The constitutional provision upon which the two previous cases were decided were entirely swept away by the amendment of 1930, and in their place we have something distinct and
different.
What was the purpose of this drastic change? A fair
answer is to be found in the Permenter case where it is said:
IId. at 608, 84 N.E. at 500.

Id. at 609, 84 N.E. at 501.
163 Wash. 659, 2 P 2d 653 (1931).
5°State ex rel Wolfe v. Permenter, 50 Wash. 164, 96 Pac. 1047 (1908); Egbert v.
Gifford, 151 Wash. 43, 275 Pac. 74 (1929).
1-163 Wash. 659, 2 P 2d 653, 662 (1931).
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as a matter of common knowledge one of the most fruitful
sources of inequality in taxation is the attempt to tax credits. Laws
for that purpose can never be effectively enforced. Efforts to conceal
the existence of credits are so successful that a few honest persons
pay the taxes and the large majority of holders do not.
These
were the evils sought to be eradicated and abolished, and to that end
the requirements that a uniform tax be assessed against all property
were swept away, and in their place were adopted constitutional provisions which say nothing about unifornitv, and do not provide that
all property shall be taxed but which do provide that all taxes shall
be uniform upon the same class of property."
I

Under the position illustrated by this case, the legislature, freed
from former limitations, may determine what property shall be taxed,
the different rates upon which different classes of property shall be
taxed and what property shall pay no tax at all, subject only to the
limitations found in the newer type of constitutional provisions. On
this point the Washington court found there was nothing unreasonable
in classifying intangibles because "all are of the same fugitive character, permitting of ready concealment
when an attempt is made
to tax them, resulting in nonenforcement and in inequality"152 In
sustaining a similar tax in State Tax Commission v Shattuck,1 3 the
court of Arizona pursued this theme to its ultimate conclusion that
classification need not be based on "essential differences in the physical
nature of conditions of the subjects of taxation, but may be based on
want of adaptability to or impracticability of applying the same
method of taxation, or on well grounded considerations of public
policy ,154
As between the Massachusetts and Washington method there can
be little doubt the latter achieves a more practical equality As will
be shown later,1 5 freedom of classification comparable to that allowed
in the Wooster case could be permitted in some jurisdictions by construing the tax in question as an excise, or by permitting the taxation
of income from intangibles under an income tax; however, other constitutional limitations may prevent the legislature from reaching intangibles except through the method of low rate segregation in the
general property tax. In Michigan, for instance, the so-called Fifteen
Mill Amendment raises serious doubts as to the constitutionality of
taxing intangibles under some form of an income tax, 56 and the result
would be the same where the general income tax is clearly unconstitutional. If a true equality of burden in taxation is to be realized m
'- Id. at 664, 2 P 2d at 655.
'm44 Ariz. 379, 38 P 2d 631 (1934).
'raIbid.
'=

See discussion in Chapter VI which will appear in the March, 1950 issue.

, Ford. Some Aspects of Intangibles Taxation in Michigan, 37 NfICH. L, Ry, 893,

895 (1939).
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attaining the ultimate objective of the uniformity provisions, it is
imperative that they be applied with a full understanding as to the
heterogeneous character of modem property interests. Of these, intangible personalty is least amenable to general property taxation.
SECTION 5.

Uniformity Within a Class
The ability to classify property to the extent illustrated in the personalty and intangibles cases does not solve all the difficulties in the
legislature's path in taxing personal property uniformly for the leeway
described m the Shattuck case is not always granted in finding a tax
uniform within the class or uniform on the same species of property
While it is usually agreed that a valid classification must be reasonable
rather than arbitrary, and cannot be based on caprice, whim, or fiction, still what constitutes a distinct kind of property or a permissible
ground for discrimmation m rate often is problematical. The question
occurs more frequently in non-property taxation where graduation
features based on quantity of income, volume of business, value of an
estate, et cetera, are involved, but interesting situations do arise where
the tax is found to be one on property
Taxing of bank stock as distinguished from other intangibles is a
problem in point. In the absence of specific constitutional provisions
to the contrary it may be permissible to tax the stock of banking institutions or other corporations differently on the strength of what has
been called "inherent characteristics which so differentiate them from
all other kinds of taxable property as to take them out of ordinary
methods of taxaton." 5 7 The reasoning here is no more complicated
than that a real difference makes for a real classification. On the other
hand, such a theory of institutional characteristics may not be extended
to cover a tax on bank stock which allows a national bank stockholder
to deduct debts and denies this privilege to a state bank stockholder,
because "whenever the legislature levies a tax on property, all property belonging to that species must be taxed at the same rate." 58
The finely drawn line seems to be that a distinction based on delineation of species is more valid than one which recognizes legal entities. Thus the legislature, in a single statute, may place intangibles
into two classes, shares of stock as contrasted with money and credits,
but may not tax corporation shares generally at a different rate from
1 People's Finance and Thrift Company v. Pima, 44 Ariz. 442, 447, 38 P 2d 6.13
(1934).
1 Stgte 13,nk v. Board of Revenue, 91 Ala. 217, 8 So. 852 (1890).
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banking, investment, trust and savings company shares. 159 In so holding the Nebraska court was guided by the thought that even though
the two rates might result in payment of precisely the same amount of
tax on both types of shares, still, since that event would be a matter
of chance, the rule of uniformity was violated. The requirement for
uniformity was given a liberal interpretation, but not extended to
include classification according to fate. This may be as good a solution as any to the court's problem of defining limits to the legislative
power. It may, however, put the tax collector in an unenviable position as is shown by the result reached in the remarkable case of Bank
v Wilson. tiu' There, in an action to recover taxes paid under protest,
a state bank claimed that its capital stock was assessed and taxed at
the general personal property rate while money and credits in substantial amounts employed and used in the same line of business, and
coming into direct competition with its capital, were assessed and
taxed at a substantially lower rate. The tax collector contended that
the tax on money and credits was unconstitutional for want of uniformity and that in fact they were subject to the same rate as other
personal property Therefore, assessing capital stock like other personal property did not result in inequality In reversing the lower
court, which had sustained a demurrer to the complaint, the South
Dakota court found that uniformity within the class permitted the
taxing of stock and money and credits at different rates than other
property It necessarily followed, in the opinion of the court, that by
showing that its shares of stock were taxed at a greater rate than other
moneyed capital the state bank could recover the excess tax. In other
words, classification based on differences between stocks, money, or
credits was a violation of uniformity Logically it would seem that a
uniformity rule broad enough to allow the one could be extended to
cover the other. In either case the distinctions made relate to the nature
or species of the property
Once it is conceded that practical equality can best be served by
taxing some property differently from other property, which is the
real justification for freedom in classification in the first place, there
is little to be gained by adding additional restrictions in the name of
uniformity. It has been said that the constitutional requirement for
uniformity "contemplates rather than forbids property classification
for just valuation,"i"" and that sentiment is quite appropriate here.
Such protection against undue discrimiation as may be needed can
State ex rel. Spillman v. Ord State Bank, 117 Neb. 189, 220 N.W. 265 (1928).
53 S. D. 82, 220 N.V. 152 (1928).
"' State ex rel Attorney General v. City of Avon Park, 108 Fla. 641, 149 So. 409
(1933).
','
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be found in the concept of equal protection of the laws. To further
confuse the already harassed tax collector and taxpayer by spinning
superfluous webs of distinction around the phrase "uniform within
the class" not only is unnecessary but places an undue emphasis on
the function of the uniformity provision as a restriction on the taxing
power.
SECTION 6.
Summary
To summarize briefly, few taxes can be characterized as clearly
in the nature of property taxes m the sense that all courts will so construe them. It seems clear that a tax levied directly against property
according to value based on some form of assessment is a property
tax, but the courts are reluctant to so construe a tax because of the
restrictive effect of uniformity provisions applicable to property
taxation.
With respect to the general property tax, problems in uniformity
may-occur in the way the tax is levied or the way it is assessed. It
seems to make little difference whether the constitution calls for a
uniform rule, a uniform rate, or a levy according to value, because all
have been applied in a strict or liberal manner at one time or the other.
It has been said in interpreting the more liberal rule that property
may be classified with reference to its kind or use, but that taxability
cannot depend on a classification of owners; while jurisdictions which
adhere to stricter standards may find that the taxpayer can be classified
but not the property The single thread of consistency in the cases
seems to be the court's preoccupation with the decisive importance of
value. Actually, there is little justification for keeping uniformity
irrevocably tied to value beyond the archaic fiscal doctrine underlying the general property tax that an ad valorem system of property
taxation is essential to an equal distribution of the expenses of government. Practical defects m the ad valorem system show up best in
the administration of the general property tax because of inequalities
in assessment, particularly where little or no deviation is made from
a strict rule of uniformity It was the breakdown of the narrow concept of uniformity at this point which led to the first major break with
the classical rule and resulted in many of the first attempts to classify
property
A statute classifying property on the basis of the clearest distinction possible, real and personal, may be unconstitutional for want of
uniformity in one jurisdiction and valid in another depending on
whether the court takes the questionable view that all property is
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homegeneous for the purpose of taxation. The consequences of such
decisions can be avoided by amending the constitution or by finding
that the purpose of uniformity is not to require that all property be
taxed, but rather that it contemplates exemptions. Attempts to tax
intangibles as property have met with reasonable success in this respect because of their elusive nature and a general realization that
they must be classified if they are to appear on the assessment rolls
at all. Even here, a court occasionally will apply the uniformity provision strictly so as to defeat the manifest purpose of the desirable
legislation. A comparatively recent Arizona case goes so far as to
suggest that it is not the function of constitutional uniformity to prevent the classification of intangibles even on the basis of "want of
adaptability to or impracticability of applying the same method of
taxation to them."
Such an interpretation, however, does not solve all the difficulties
inherent in applying uniformity to property taxation, for there remains
the problem of determining the meaning of uniformity within a class.
The question occurs more frequently in non-property taxation where
graduation features based on quantity of income, volume of business,
value of an estate, et cetera, are involved, but interesting situations do
arise where the tax is found to be one on property In taxing bank
stock, for instance, there seems to be a finely drawn line of distinction
based on a delineation of species of property which does not extend
to a difference in legal entities. Thus, a Nebraska court has sustained
a statute which places intangibles into two classes, shares of stock as
contrasted with money and credits, although it will not permit the
taxation of corporate shares generally at a different rate from banking,
investment, trust and savings company shares. The guiding thought
in this instance seemed to be that even though the two rates might
result in payment of precisely the same amount of tax on both types
of shares, such was a matter of chance and the rule of uniformity was
violated.
Once it is conceded that practical equality can *bestbe served by
taxing some property differently from other property which is the real
justification for classifying property in the first place, there is little to
be gained by placing additional obstacles in the legislature's path in
the name of uniformity within the class. In addition, such protection
against undue discrimination as may be needed can be found in the
concept of equal protection of the laws.

(To Be Continued)

